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AGENCY-1954 TENNESSEE SURVEY
MERTON L FERSON*

Scope of Employment:
In the case of McKinnon v. Michaud,- it appeared that Mrs. McKinnon was in the business of distributing petroleum products wholesale.
Her servant, Nickson, made delivery of gasoline to a service station,
put the nozzle from his truck into the retailer's tank and then carelessly allowed the tank to overflow. Nickson then enhanced he
danger by throwing water on the gasoline with the result that it
splashed onto an open stove and caused an extensive fire that damaged the plaintiff. Mrs. McKinnon was held liable. The court did not
decide whether Nickson's act of throwing water on the gasoline was
or was not within the scope of his employment. His carelessness in
allowing the tank to overflow was taken to be the primary and proximate cause of the injury. That act was clearly within the scope of
Nickson's employment.
Two earlier Tennessee decisions are recalled and distinguished in
Judge Anderson's opinion. One was the case of Kelly v. Louisiana Oil
Refining Co.2 In this case it appeared that a servant of the defendant
Oil Company was in the act of telephoning the company office from
a store where he had made a delivery of gasoline. While telephoning,
he was smoking and threw away a lighted match. The match ignited
plaintiff's clothing and caused injury. It was held that the servant's
act of smoking and throwing away the match was not in the scope
of his employment. The company therefore was not liable.
The other case referred to and distinguished was Shuck v. Carney.3
In this case it appeared that the defendant Shuck operated a garage.
Reynolds, a servant of the defendant, was engaged in getting plaintiff's car out of a ditch where it had skidded and overturned. Gasoline
had been spilled on the ground. Reynolds struck a match to light a
cigarette and then dropped the match on the ground where it ignited
the gasoline with the result that plaintiff's automobile was badly
damaged. The defendant was held not liable.
These two cases that were referred to and distinguished are interesting illustrations of the fact that a servant can be doing acts outside
his employment and at the very same time be doing other acts that
are within his employment. These two cases are clearly distinguishable from the McKinnon case in this: spillingthe-gasoline-was clearly
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Dean Emeritus, University of
Cincinnati College of Law. Author, Principles of Agency (1954).
1. 260 S.W.2d 721 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
2. 167 Tenn. 101, 66 S.W.2d 997 (1934).

3. 22 Tenn. App. 125, 118 S.W.2d 896 (W.S. 1938).
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within the scope of Nickson's employment, but the acts of smoking
and throwing down matches in the other two cases were clearly
outside the scope of the employment of the respective servants.
The case of Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Dedmon" was a
suit brought by the widow of William Dedmon to recover under the
Workmen's Compensation Law for the injury to and death of Mr.
Dedmon. The question was whether the injury and death of Dedmon
arose out of and in the course of his employment.
Dedmon was a lumber inspector. He had gone to Morristown on
the business of his employer. It was his duty to inspect lumber at a
lumber yard in Morristown during 7 or 8 hours of each day. It was
his further duty to proceed in his automobile to a hotel where, during
the evening he was expected to write reports and to be available for
telephone calls. On the evening of the accident Dedmon drove part
way from the lumber yard, where he had been working, to the hotel.
He then parked his car on the right side of the street and walked
to a service station on the left side of the street to display and discuss
some fishing equipment. While walking back to his car he was struck
by an automobile and killed. The trial judge held that Dedmon's
accident came within the terms of the statute. But the Supreme Court,
in an opinion written by Justice Tomlinson, held that Dedmon, at the
time and place he was struck, was on a personal mission, and so there
could be no recovery from his injury and death under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The view taken by the Supreme Court is summed
up in this passage from Judge Tomlinson's opinion: "It is true that the
deviation was slight insofar as distance is concerned, but in making
such deviation Mr. Dedmon exposed himself to a hazard in no way
connected with his employment." The court bolsters its opinion by
pertinent citations. One is the Tennessee case of Toombs v. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co.5 In that case it was held that a night watchman who
went to a nearby restaurant to get food, and who was struck while
returning to his job was not entitled to compensation under the Act.
Another is an Indiana case, In re Betts6 , where the facts were much
like the Dedmon case. In this Indiana case a servant of a tinner, who
had been riding in his master's wagon toward a job, got out of the
wagon, while. the horse was being watered, and walked across the
street to get tobacco for himself. He was struck and killed by a passing
automobile. His family was not allowed to recover under the Act.
Servant Exonerated: Master Held.
The case of Olson v. Sharpe7 presents this paradox: A workman
who backed a truck over the plaintiff was not negligent and yet a
4. 264 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. 1951). 5. 173 Tenn. 38, 114 S.W.2d 785 (1938).

6. 66 Ind. App. 484, 118 N.E. 551 (1918).

7. 259 S.W.2d 867 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
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remote employer was deemed to be negligent and so liable to the
plaintiff. The paradox is explained when the facts are stated more
at length. They are these: The Bridges Paving Company had a paving
contract. That company engaged the Moran Trucking Company to
hand hot asphalt from the mixer to the paving operation. A man, by
name of Phillips, was engaged by the Moran Company to furnish four
trucks with drivers to assist in the operation. Sharp was employed by
Phillips to drive one of the trucks.
On the day of the accident the plaintiff, an engineer, as part of his
work, was inspecting a curb inlet and stood with his back to the
truck that ran him down. Sharp was backing a truck loaded with
7 tons of asphalt up grade. From the left door of his cab he watched
and could see for 25 or 30 feet where his left wheels were going. He
could not see where his right wheels were going. None of the parties
involved provided a flagman or watchman in connection with the
backing operations of trucks. Drills and other machinery in the area
were making a great deal of noise. Sharp backing his truck at the rate
of 5 or 6 miles per hour struck the plaintiff and injured him grievously.
The jury found that Sharp violated no duty to persons in the area.
The court accepted the verdict as determinative and Sharp was exonerated. But the Bridges Paving Company was held for not providing
a flagman or watchman to guard against accidents such as befell the
plaintiff. The exoneration of Sharp is consistent with holding the
Bridges Company when it is remembered that the Bridges Company
is not held as master of Sharp. The doctrine of respondeat superior
has nothing to do with the case.
The court reconciles the decision in this case with D. B. Loveman
Co. v. Baylesss: "In that case the Court stated the general rule to be
that when the master is sued solely for injuries resulting from the act
of his servants, being liable for their conduct only under the doctrine,
of respondeat superior, a verdict, permitted to stand in favor of the
servants, entitles the master to a discharge from such claimed liability." But continued the court in that case "If the evidence shows
liability of the master on grounds other than the misconduct of his
servants, he may be held, notwithstanding a verdict in favor of the
servant."9 In this case of Olson v. Sharp, the Bridges Company is
probably not even the master of Sharp. At any rate their liability is
not predicated on the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Servants: Independent Contractors.
Two recent cases raised an oft recurring and vexatious question, viz.,
were the respective workers that were involved servants or inde8. 128 Tenn. 307, 160 S.W. 841 (1913)..
9. 259 S.W.2d at 871.
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pendent contractors? It may not be amiss to note why the status of
these workers was important.
There are two ways of getting a job done. The person who wants
it done can do it himself by his own efforts, management and hired
help; or he can bargain with someone else for the desired result. When
he hires personal services and retains the management of the enterprise he is called a "master," the person hired is called a "servant,"
and the master is liable for what the servant does in the master's
behalf. But when one bargains for a given result he does not then
become a master, the person bargained with is called an independent
contractor, and he does not act in behalf of the employer.'0 The well
known doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in this latter
situation."
The worker's status is important in another connection. He gets
the benefit of Workmen's Compensation Acts if he is a servant, but
2
not if he is an independent contractor.1
The case of Chapman v. Evans" grew out of an accident wherein
the plaintiffs were injured by a truck being driven by Evans. It appeared that Evans had been hired by Wall, the owner of the truck.
It appeared, too, that Wall had an agreement with the Warren Brothers
Roads Co. to do hauling for it. On the day of the accident Evans,
driving Wall's truck, had made a delivery of some asphalt for the
Warren Company and was on his way home when the accident happened. The plaintiff brought suit against Evans, Wall and the Warren
Company. The trial court dismissed the suit as against the Warren
Company and the Court of Appeals sustained the dismissal with one of
the three judges dissenting. Judge Howell, who wrote the majority
opinion, accepted the "control test" as crucial in determining the status
of Evans with reference to the Warren Company. That is, did the
Warren Company have a right to control Evans as to the manner of
doing his job? The majority of the court felt so strongly that Wall,
and not the Warren Company, had this right to control that they
sustained the dismissal of the suit against the Warren Company.
Judge Felts, in his dissenting opinion, emphasized that "In determining whether one employed to do work for another is a servant
or an independent contractor, the test 'always is whether the party
for whom the work was being done had the right of control in the
doing of that work."' And, he continued, "Where employment appears,
the presumption is that the one doing work for another is a servant."
It seemed to Judge Felts from the facts of the case that Evans was a
10. The word "employer" is here used in a sense that includes one who
bargains for a result as well as one who hires services.
11. HARPER, TORTS § 292 (1933).
12. Ewing v. Vaughn, 169 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1948); Benson v. Social Security
Board, 172 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1949).
13. 261 S.W.2d 132 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
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servant of the Warren Company. At any rate the question was, in
his opinion, one for the jury. He accordingly believed that the judgments of dismissal were wrong.
The significant thing is that both the majority and the minority
opinions accepted the control test as crucial in determining the status
of Evans.
The case of Weeks v. McConne11'4 was a suit by McConnell to recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act for injuries he received
in connection with his work. The claim was resisted on the theory
that McConnell was an independent contractor.
It appeared that Weeks was a contractor in the business of building
residences for sale. McConnell was a paper hanger. McConnell hung
paper for Weeks. He was paid $1.00 a roll for his work, furnished his
own tools, worked and quit at such hours as he pleased and took no
directions from Weeks. "Nothing was said as to the right of Weeks
to discharge McConnell at any time it might please Weeks to do so."
McConnell recovered in the trial court. Weeks appealed, and, says
Justice Tomlinson, "thereby presents for decision by this Court a
border line question." The Supreme Court upheld the judgment for
McConnell.

The court, in coming to its decision, invokes the control test. Says
Justice Tomlinson, "The question is whether the right to so control
existed. If so, the status of McConnell was that of a servant." So far
the opinion is conventional. But, later in the opinion, the Justice makes
a good point that is generally neglected, viz., the ability of the employer to terminate the employment at will. "The rule in this state"
says the Justice, "is that the legal right of an employer to terminate
the employment at any time is 'considered as a strong circumstance
tending to show the subserviency of the employee' and 'that no single
fact is more conclusive perhaps' that the status of the parties is that of
master and servant." The relation of that passage to the right of
control will be discussed in the next paragraph.
It is assumed that a master has a right to control the doings of his
servant. Putting the same idea another way, it is assumed that the
servant is under a duty to obey his master. Whence comes this duty
of the servant? It could be provided for in a contract between the
master and servant. But in most instances no such right is expressly
contracted for. Indeed there need not be any contract in the sense that
the master undertakes to hire, or the servant, to work. One who accepts the services of a volunteer ipso facto is liable for unlawful acts
of the volunteer in the rendition of the services. 15 This right to con14. 264 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1954).
15. Hill v. Morey, 26 Vt. 178 (1854); Moore v. El Paso Chamber of Commerce,
220 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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trol seems to exist only if and so long as the services are received.
Since no one is obliged to accept the services of another he can elect
to take them on any condition he chooses to impose. Can it not be
reasonably implied that services are accepted on condition that the
master has a right to control the doings of the servant? The legal
right of an employer to terminate the employment of a worker may
be a more reliable and basic test than the control test.
It should be noted, too, that the right to control is only a test. It is
not a basis for the master and servant relationship. The worker is not
a servant because the master has a right to control him. It is the
reverse. He is subject to control because he is a servant. The right of
the master to control is not the basic cause on which the status of the
worker depends. That status depends on whether services are given
and received. The right to control is an incident. It is much used as
a test, but it is not a fact that fixes the worker's status.
Agent as Fiduciary
It is well settled that an agent is a fiduciary in relation to his
principal just as a trustee is a fiduciary in relation to his cestui que
trust. The case of Bell v. Gailey16 illustrates that proposition. Mrs.
Bell, the plaintiff, was an aged and rather illiterate person. One of the
defendants, Jones, was a real estate broker and was also in the loan
business. Mrs. Bell, through Jones, procured a loan of $302.00 by
mortgaging her home. Later, Mrs. Bell called upon Jones to sell the
property for her. After some negotiation, Jones contracted to buy the
pxoperty for $1,140.00. Mrs. 'Bell in said contract agreed to convey
the property to Jones, or his nominee. Jones then arranged a sale
of the property to Gailey for $2,500.00. A deed was made by Mrs. Bell
to Gailey. The purchase money notes were discounted, with the net
result that Jones received $1,800.00 after buying the property from
his principal, Mrs. Bell, for $1,140.00 The chancellor awarded to Mrs.
Bell $500.00 in a decree against Jones. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the award. The opinion, written by Judge Anderson, is well supported
by other Tennessee cases, particularly McNeill v. Dobson-Bainbridge
Realty Co.'7 and Wilson v. Hayes.18
16. 260 S.W.2d 300 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1951).
17. 184

Tenn. 99, 195 S.W.2d 625 (1946).

18. 29 Tenn.App. 49, 193 S.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1946).

